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1. INTRODUCTION

Wealthy governments frequently "tie" their foreign aid by
linking official support for developing nations to the procurement
of goods and services from the donor nation.' Sometimes the
use of tied aid is "intended to supplement the working of the
market.. . [by enabling] trade to take place when and where
it does not attract commercial financing.... . 2 More often, aidtying is intended to benefit national exporters. For example,
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1 INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEPIT OF COMMERCE, INT'L FINANCING PROGRAMS
AND U.S. INT'L ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 5 (1990) [hereinafter INT'L

FINANCING].
Technically, "Tied Aid is concessional financing linked to procurement
of goods and services in the donor country. Tied Aid credits can either stand
alone orbe mixed with commercial financing or standard official export credits.
The latter are called mixed credits." Reauthorizationof the Export-Import
Bank 1992: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Financeand MonetaryPolicy
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 53 (1992) [hereinafter SenateBanking Hearing](statement of William
E. Barreda, Deputy Asst. Secretary for Trade and Investment Policy, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury).
The most recent example of a U.S. tied aid credit offer involved a $13
million sale of an air traffic control system to Tunisia. In response to stiff
competition from France, the Export-Import Bank of the United States
("Eximbank") approved tied aid support that enabled Westinghouse Electric
Corporation to win the Tunisian contract. The resulting Eximbank mixed
credit package consisted of a 40% grant element ($5 million) and a 60% direct
loan ($7.9 million). See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 15(G) OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT

OF 1945, AS AMENDED (Section 19 of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-472) 7 (June 18, 1992); Exim Approves Mixed Creditfor Sale of U.S.
Goods, Services To Tunisia, 9 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1487, 1495 (Aug. 26,
1992); see also EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO
CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 15(G) OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945,
AS AMENDED 12 (Apr. 26, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT].
2 John E. Ray, COMMERCIAL VIABILITY IN THE HELSINKI PACKAGE,
SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 2 (Dec. 18, 1991). For example, a developing nation may be
unable to obtain project financing either because the project is unattractive
to commercial lenders or because a market imperfection exists. Id.
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by tying its aid, the donor nation may help a domestic exporter
win a contract from a developing nation that would otherwise
go to a foreign competitor.' Such practices, however, interfere
4
with the normal functioning of the market.
Often, major industrialized nations attempt to design foreign
aid packages to benefit the recipient nations while stimulating
their own economies, a practice which causes market imperfections. The United States, however, has traditionally focused
most of its foreign assistance on helping developing nations meet
basic human needs. As a result, U.S. businesses have lost global
market share not because their goods are of lower quality or
are overpriced, but because foreign businesses benefit from their
governments' export promotion policies.' As a practical matter,
commercially-motivated tied aid practices by other industrialized
nations shut U.S. exporters out of a $10 to $12 billion market
in capital goods transactions, leading to an annual loss in U.S.
exports of $2.4 to $4.8 billion.'

3

Export-Import Bank Report to Congress On Tied Aid Credit Practices:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy andTrade ofthe House
Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter 1989
Eximbank Hearing] (statement of Rep. Sam Gejdenson, Chairman). For
example, in 1986, an American company lost an $8 million contract to install
a cellular communications system in China to a Swedish company because
the Swedish government offered a substantial amount of grant assistance
linked to its company receiving the contract. The $8 million initial contract
had an estimated $80 million of follow-on business through 1995, reflecting
an even greater loss for the U.S. company. Id.
" See Ray, supranote 2, at 2. Ray discusses the concept of"additionality,"
which suggests that government supported funds (i.e., non-commercial financing)
should be in additionto commercial financing. "To minimize trade distortion,
non-commercial financing should increase flows of resources," not replace
commercial financing. Id. (emphasis in original). See also INT'L FINANCING,
supra note 1, at 35.
'See Andrew M. Moravcsik, DiscipliningTradeFinance: The OECD Export
CreditArrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173 (1989).
6 ERNEST H. PREEG, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTL STUDIES, THE TIED
AID CREDIT ISSUE: U.S. EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

6 (1989) [hereinafter PREEG CSIS STUDY]. This study of tied aid credits was
undertaken after Eximbank reported to Congress on the issue in 1989.
Ambassador Preeg criticized the Eximbank report for its gross underestimation
of the damage that other nations' use of tied aid credits does to the U.S.
economy. Eximbank had reported that U.S. exporters are shut out of a $4
to $6 billion marketin capital goods, resultingin an annual sales loss of $400
to $800 million. 1989 Eximbank Hearing,supra note 3, at 14-15 (statement
of William F. Ryan, Acting President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank
ofhttps://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/5
the United States). Preeg's figures have generally been accepted in lieu
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Members of both Congress and the business community have
strongly urged the U.S. government to utilize tied aid credit
practices and to increase general support for capital projects
financing. In both of these areas, the United States has lagged
far behind other industrialized nations." Such a policy would
enable U.S. exporters to regain lost global market share, which
in turn would strengthen the U.S. domestic economy by creating
more jobs in the United States.' Moreover, as economic strength
supersedes military strength as a key indicator of a nation's
international status, this policy would ensure that the United
States maintains its leadership role in international affairs.
This Comment examines the practice of aid-tying, the history
of U.S. tied aid policy, the current international agreement
covering tied aid credit practices, and congressional and domestic
business dissatisfaction with current U.S. policy. Section 2 of
this Comment describes the aid-tying process and explores the
problems created by the use of tied aid credits and mixed credits.'
Section 3 reviews the history of the U.S. government's efforts
to reduce the use of tied aid credits through negotiations within
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
of Eximbank's conclusions.
Congress sharply criticized the 1989 Eximbank Report for its failure to
make recommendations. Id. at 19. The Bush Administration subsequently
offered suggestions in a letter to the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate. Letter from Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury, and
John D. Macomber, President and Chairman ofEximbank, to Thomas S. Foley,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Sept. 11, 1989), reprintedin PREEG
CSIS STUDY, supra, at Appendix B.
' Capital projects financing is particularly susceptible to tied aid credit
practices. Moreover, capital projects financing is attractive to donor nation
governments because it enables them to expand exports, to penetrate markets,
to establish standards that induce follow-on exports, and to support domestic
industrial policy goals. See INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 36. The 1989
Eximbank report estimated that the 83% of Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development notifications of tied aid credit offers were in
the five major capital infrastructure sectors of computer equipment, earthmoving
equipment, electric power generating equipment, rail transportation equipment,
and telecommunications. 1989 Eximbank Hearing, supra note 3, at 10
(statement of William F. Ryan).
In 1988, the United States spent 14.3% of its bilateral aid on capital projects.
By contrast, France spent 27.7%; Germany, 46%; Japan, 60.7%; the United
Kingdom, 41.8%; Canada, 30.2%; and Italy, 61.2%. INT'L FINANCING, supra
note 1, at 38.
' See infra note 35.
* This Comment will use the terms "tied aid credits" and mixed credits"
interchangeably.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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("OECD").10 Section 3 also includes with an explanation of the
Helsinki Package, which is the most recent OECD agreement
covering tied aid credits, and the general Bush and Clinton
Administration reactions to the Helsinki Package. Section 4
surveys Congressional responses, particularly legislative
initiatives, to the problems created by tied aid and to the
possibility of expanded U.S. participation in the international
capital projects market. Section 5 examines the positions of the
U.S. business community on tied aid credits and on the Helsinki
Package. This Comment then concludes that the U.S. government
should bring its foreign aid policy more in line with the aid
policies of other industrialized nations either through the
aggressive use of tied aid credits or through increased funding
for capital projects which result in substantial domestic economic
benefit.
2. TIED AID CREDITS AND MIXED CREDITS PRACTICES

2.1. Defining Tied Aid, Tied Aid Credits,And Mixed Credits
"Tied aid credits" and "mixed credits" are elusive terms that
are often used interchangeably. Both are forms of "tied aid, " "
a broad term that encompasses the provision of foreign assistance
to a developing country on concessional terms tied to the
procurement of goods or services from the donor country. Tied
aid financing may be provided on a grant basis or as a "mixed
credit." Mixed credits produce below-market interest rates by
combining government grants, concessional government loans,

'0 Twenty-four nations, including the United States and other G-7 countries,
are represented at the OECD, which was created after World War II to foster
post-war economic recovery. Comprised of the world's wealthier countries,
the organization has more recently coordinated the economic policy of
industrialized nations vis-a-vis developing nations. Telephone Interview with
Robert Y. Lee, Director, Office of Finance, Trade Development, and Intl Trade
Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Feb. 2, 1993).
" Tied aid is defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD as "aid funds required to be spent on imports mainly from the donor

country or a few countries. Untied aid is available for procurement from
essentially any source. Partially untied aid is available to finance imports
from donor and substantially all developing countries." INT'L FINANCING, supra
note 1, at 31. In principle, when a donor's aid is untied, exporters from other
industrialized nations can access the aid funds. When aidis fully or partially
tied, rival exporters' access is restricted. Id.
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and commercial loans. 2 "Tied aid credits" are mixed credits
that are linked to the procurement of goods or services from the
donor country.' 3
2.2. Commercially-MotivatedTied Aid
Unlike the United States, many industrialized nations use
mixed credits and tied aid credits to promote capital goods
exports.14 Through these credits, which often appear in the
form of export subsidies, governments provide official assistance
to their exporters, giving the exporters considerable advantage
over foreign competitors. In effect, donor nations use their foreign
assistance programs to influence procurement decisions by
developing nations in favor of the donor's exporters. 5 As a
",The grant element is the portion of the tied aid package which, in effect,
does not have to be repaid and carries no interest. The grant element can
appear either as an outright disbursal of funds that on its face carries no
repayment requirements or as a significantly below-market rate loan. The
latter type of "grant elements are determined by the present discounted value
of future repayments of an aid loan against a hypothetical loan at market
rates, expressed as a percentage (for instance, an aid loan with... 70% of
grant aid and 30% of market loan)." Dean C. Alexander, The Export-Import
Bank of the UnitedStates'BattleAgainst SubsidizedExport Credits, 9 DICK.
J. INT'L. L. 267, 273 (1991).

A simple way to think about it follows: if GovernmentA offers a package
of goods for sale for $10 million, consisting of $3 million in grant funds and
$7 million in commercial loans, and GovernmentB offers a $10 million package
of similar goods financed solely by commercial loans, the donee will choose
Government A's package. Since grant funds do not have to be repaid, the
recipient nation owes Government A $7 million (plus interest), whereas it
would owe.Government B $10 million (plus interest). See id. at 272.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT
TO ACCOMPANY S.2864, EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1992, S. REP. No. 320,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1992) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 320].
13

"Concessional funds are sometimes provided in the form of a general
line of credit or a line which may be used for a group of projects. The donor
nation, however, often requires that export credit funds and concessional funds
be blended together in a predetermined ratio, or that the mixed credit is offered
for one specific project." John A. Bohn, Jr., Eximbank's Role in International
Bankingand Finance:Loans, Reschedulings, and Development, 20 INT'L LAW.
14

829, 834 (1986).

The main providers of tied aid credits are the other G-7 nations: Japan,
Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. See infra Section
2.2.2.

"' See, e.g., supranote 3. In 1991, a $600 million low-interest loan by the
Japanese government enabled a Japanese company to win an $850 million
contract to build an electric power generating station in India. Steve Coll,
Foreign
Aid, WASH.
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result, U.S.
exporters lose between $2.4 and $4.8 billion
6
annually.1

The use of tied aid credits has created "spoiled markets."
These markets include many Asian countries such as Indonesia,
India, Thailand, China, and the Philippines."' The governments
of these countries expect to receive offers of tied aid credits, and
they play one donor country off of another in order to receive
the most lenient credit terms.'"
Mixed credit practices have also spoiled certain sectors of
the recipient nations' economies, particularly capital infrastructure industries such as telecommunications, power, transportation,
and construction equipment." Like spoiled markets, spoiled
sectors predominantly receive trade-distorting tied aid offers
instead of conventional commercial financing."0
2.2.1. U.S. Tied Aid Policy
For the past twenty years, the United States has condemned
the use of tied aid for commercial purposes.2 ' Such aid distorts
both market forces and development assistance activities."
It gives domestic exporters an unfair advantage and draws limited
development assistance funds away from humanitarian efforts
and towards capital projects.24

in 137
CONG. REC. $2811 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991).
16
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17 Spoiled markets are so heavily blanketed with tied aid credit offers that
exporters must have concessional financing support to enter these markets.
INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 40.

" For example, while the current international agreement requires at least
a 35% grant element, Indonesia is so flooded with tied aid credit offers that
it can command a 40% grant element. 1989 Eximbank Hearing,supra note
3, at 22-23.
" See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 15(G) OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945,
AS AMENDED (Section 19 of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-472) 2 (Oct. 25, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT].
2
01d. at 7.
21 S. REP. No. 320, supra note 13, at 4. However, the United States ties
a substantial amount of agricultural and military assistance to the procurement
of U.S. goods. Id.
22 SenateBanking Hearing,supranote 1, at 53 (statement of William F.
Barreda).
s S. REP. No. 320, supra note 13, at 4.
24 The Commerce Department explains that:
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The U.S. government draws a sharper line between export
credits and development assistance than most industrialized
nations. The Agency for International Development ("AID")2 5
reserves most development assistance funds to help underdeveloped countries meet basic human needs.2" This strategy
has been part of AID's mandate since 1973. Commercial projects
should be financed on commercial credit terms, which fall under
7
the purview of the Export-Import Bank ("Eximbank").Y

Aid-tying is not an ideal practice. In principle, aid that is untied is more
efficient because the recipient is allowed to import from the most suitable
and cost-effective suppliers. Experience also suggests that tied aid can
lead to inefficient and wasteful procurement practices, sometimes with
relatively low development impact. Biases can be created favoring aidgiving for those economic sectors absorbing capital equipment and for
relatively more industrialized developing countries, to the detriment of
others.
INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 31.
"' AID is the principle U.S. government agency implementing the U.S.
foreign development assistance program.
"' See Bohn, supranote 14, at 834. In 1973, Congress shifted AID's focus
to humanitarian aid, leaving large-scale capital infrastructure projects to
multilateral development banks. Development assistance was directed to
help meet basic human needs through rural, small-scale projects involving
agricultural production, health, education, and nutrition. Where commercial
interests were implicated, U.S. aid was designed to help develop compatible
industries in developing countries instead of using the countries as markets
for U.S. goods. James K. Jackson, Tied Aid Credits, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, Oct.
21, 1991, at 3-4.
U.S. bilateral economic aid has three main components: project funding,
mostly for basic human needs; cash transfers; and food aid. Ernest H. Preeg,
The Aid for Trade Debate, 16 WASH. Q. 99-100 (1993) [hereinafter Aid for
Trade Debate]. Preeg and others have also criticized the U.S. cash transfer
program because transfers usually cannot be tied to the procurement of U.S.
goods. Id. at 100.
17 See Bohn, supranote 14, at 834. Bohn's article describes the three major
functions of Eximbank:
(1) [T]o provide guarantees and export credit insurance so that exporters
and their bankers will provide credit to foreign buyers;
(2) to neutralize financing as a factor by offering loans direct to foreign
buyers and loans to U.S. banks with interest rates and repayment terms
which are competitive with other countries' export credit agencies; and
(3) to participate in negotiations with other countries which are
designed to reduce the level of subsidy in export credits.
Id. at 829 (citation omitted). The author is the first Vice President and Vice
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2.2.2. The PositionOf OtherMajorIndustrializedCountries
The aid policies of Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy,
France, and Germany, in contrast to U.S. policy, reflect an
acknowledgement of the domestic political appeal of tied aid.2"
Thus, these countries resort to tied aid more frequently than
the United States. Two rationales support this behavior: (1)
aid-tying builds political support from domestic businesses for
higher foreign aid budgets; and (2) "defensive or compensatory"
aid-tying is necessary to remain competitive with the exporters
29
of nations that already tie their aid for commercial reasons.
The widespread use of tied aid credits reflects a foreign assistance
policy oriented towards capital projects, 0 which yield substantially higher domestic economic returns than the U.S. foreign
aid program."1

28 See 1989 Eximbank Hearing,supra note 3, at 13 (statement of William
F. Ryan). However, not all OECD nations share the same attitude about tied
aid credits. Some countries, like Canada and the United Kingdom, consider
the practice a necessary evil that is expensive for their taxpayers. Id. at 42.
On the other hand, the Japanese government has been heavily criticized for
its business orientation. Japan provides large amounts ofpre-project funding
for feasibility studies. "At the pre-project feasibility stage, Japanese engineering
and supplier companies are already engaged with the host country's
implementing agencies .... " Aid for Trade Debate, supra note 26, at 100.
These feasibility studies enable the Japanese companies to propose projects
specifically designed for their areas of expertise. Arelationship of trust develops
between the Japanese company and the developing nation's government, and
often the result is that the -governmentselects the Japanese engineers. Although
the Japanese have gone further than other nations in untying the procurement
for many projects by making it subject to competitive bidding, this untying
is largely technical, since the engineering portion is tied de facto through the
feasibility studies. Id. at 101; see also Coll, supra note 15, at H1.
28 INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 31.

* For example, in 1988, the United States committed 14.3% of its bilateral
aid to economic infrastructure and production, in sharp contrast to the other
OECD nations during the same year. Italy committed 61.2%; Japan, 60.7%;
Germany, 46%; the United Kingdom, 41.8%; Canada, 30.2%; and France, 27.7%.
Id. at 38.
S The United States commits almost 75% of its foreign assistance to
humanitarian goals and budget support. Id. at 37. However, the advent of
the Helsinki Package, discussed infra at Section 3.2, appears to have coincided
with a heightened awareness within the United States of the importance of
capital projects assistance within a foreign aid program.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/5
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2.3. The ProsAnd Cons Of U.S. EngagementIn
Practices

iedAid Credit

Some analysts argue that a more aggressive U.S. tied aid
program is necessary because other governments' use of aid tying
causes significantly more damage to the U.S. economy than
originally thought. The use of tied aid credits is much more
pervasive than the 1989 report by Eximbank suggested.3 " U.S.
exporters are not only shut out of a $10 to $12 billion market
in capital goods transactions, but also consequently lose millions
of dollars in follow-on sales generated by the need for replacements, spare parts, and maintenance." Other supporters of
tied aid credits argue that in the post-Cold War era, economic
might, not military prowess, is necessary for the United States
to maintain its status as a leader in international affairs. 4
The use of tied aid credits for capital infrastructure projects will
translate into higher U.S. exports, resulting in more jobs at home
and a stronger domestic economy.3 " Many members of both
Congress and the business community argue that efforts to
negotiate a reduction in the practice have failed. Only if the
United States uses tied aid credits more aggressively will other
countries be willing to change.3" Finally, since other countries
have been reluctant to curb their use of tied aid credits, the
United States must engage in mixed credit financing merely to
remain competitive. 7
Opponents of tied aid credits and other export promotion
subsidies argue that no conclusive evidence exists that such
practices in fact promote exports. They argue that such subsidies
would only alter the composition of U.S. exports, favoring
SI See supra note

6.

a Servicing and spare parts purchases can amount, annually, to 10-15%
of the original project price. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,

A KEY TO U.S. EXPORT SUCCESS 4 (rev. ed. May 11, 1992) [hereinafter NAM
REPORT].
s 4 See infra Section 4.
s The Commerce Department estimates that each $1 billion of exports
creates 19,100 jobs in the United States. Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on
Int'l Dev., Fin., Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance,and UrbanAffairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1992) [hereinafter House
BankingHearing](statement of Thomas J. Mullany, President, Rockwell Int'l
Credit Corp., on behalf of The Coalition for Employment through Exports).
31
See infra Sections 4 and 5.
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subsidized goods"8 while imposing significant costs on the
taxpayer 9 and on unsubsidized industries.' The United States
would merely be adding to the negative effects of tied aid credits.
Mixed credit financing distorts world trade, producing inefficient
capital markets and inefficient use of resources.
Other government officials argue that foreign aid must be
used for humanitarian purposes, strategic and national security
objectives, rather than for self-interested commercial reasons. 4
The former objectives enhance American political influence abroad,
while the latter arguably do not. Budget constraints would force
a larger tied aid credit program to divert funds from current
foreign assistance programs. This might enhance U.S. commercial
interests, but at the cost of diminished U.S. political influence
abroad.4
3. THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE OECD

Instead of joining in the mixed credit practices of other
countries, the United States has attempted to negotiate a
reduction in the use of tied aid credits.4" Most of these
negotiations have been conducted within the framework of the
OECD.43
3.1. Negotiations In The 1970's And 1980"s
International negotiations over export credits began in the
1970's in response to fears that the world oil crisis would provoke

" 1989 Eximbank Hearing,supra note 3, at 15 (statement of William F.
Ryan). Although Eximbank did not formally make recommendations in the
1989 report, Ryan's testimony nonetheless suggests that the agency opposed
the use of tied aid credits at that time.
MId. at 16.
4
Aid For Trade Debate, supra note 26, at 104.
41 For a synopsis of the arguments for and against tied aid as well as a
general discussion of export promotion and American foreign policy, see Curt
Tarnoff& Larry Nowels, The Aid for Trade Debate,3 POLICY Focus (Overseas
Development Council, Washington, D.C.), at 2, 6-7 (1993) [hereinafter ODC
PAPER]. This article is part of a series published by the Overseas Development
Council, a non-profit organization, on major U.S.-Third World development
issues.
' Susan M. Frank, Making the Most ofForeignAid, J. COMMERCE, reprinted
in 137 CONG. REC. S10,861 (daily ed. July 25, 1991).
' For a thorough history of OECD export credit negotiations, see Moravcsik,
supra note 5, at 176-90; see also INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 53-58.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/5
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an export credit war. After the first oil price shock, various
informal agreements within the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), OECD, and G-5 summit meetings were reached among
major industrialized nations to regulate export subsidies."
In 1976, "the seven summit countries of the [OECD] reached
a secret, non-binding . . . 'Consensus,' or 'Gentlemen's
Agreement,'" to limit excessive export credit competition. '
In 1978, the members formalized and extended the Consensus
in the "Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export
Credits."
This Arrangement stabilized international
competition, but countries still managed to circumvent it through
the use of tied aid credits, which the Arrangement and previous

informal agreements had ignored.47
In the early 1980's, the use of tied aid credits began to attract
attention.4 8 A fundamental restructuring of the Arrangement
in 19834' banned tied aid credits having grant components of
less than 20%. The 1983 agreement also required "greater
discipline and transparency in the use of tied-aid credit"5 0 and
eliminated most conventional export credit subsidies." That
same year, Congress authorized AID and Eximbank to engage
jointly in tied aid financing in an effort to U.S. businesses secure

44 Moravcsik, supra note 5, at 180.
4 Id. at 180-81; See INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 54.
"Moravcsik, supranote 5, at 181. The Arrangement's current 22 members
are known as the "Participants," an informal group affiliated with the OECD.
See supra note 43; see also infra note 66. The Participants meet regularly
to discuss and modify the Arrangement. INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at
54.
For a comparison of the agreements and Arrangements from 1969-1987,
see Moravcsik, supra note 5, at Table 1.
4'France pioneered the practice of mixed credits in the 1970's, with the
Japanese and British following suit. Moravcsik, supra note 5, at 181-82.
France was roundly criticized for flouting the Consensus through its use of
tied aid credits. The High Cost of Export Credit, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 14,
1981, at 92 (U.S. ed. at 78).
48 INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 54-55.
4'For a more in-depth explanation of the 1983 Arrangement, see Export
Credits: The Consensus Agrees to Differ, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 1993, at
108 (U.S. ed. at 94).
M
Moravcsik, supra note 5, at 186.
'l Tied aid and mixed credits differ from conventional export subsidies
insofar as the former combine conventional export credits with concessional
INTVL
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note 1,2014
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contracts.
The Reagan Administration preferred to deal with the problem
of tied aid credits through negotiations, instead of engaging in
the practice itself.' Throughout the 1980's, both the Reagan
and Bush Administrations worked within the OECD framework
to raise the cost of mixed credit practices by increasing the
required grant element. By raising the cost to the donor nation,
the United States hoped to decrease the use of commerciallymotivated tied aid. 4
Contrary to the Administration's preference for negotiation,
Congress repeatedly argued that other nations would respond
only if the United States extended tied aid credits aggressively
enough to defeat foreign competition. 5 Under pressure from
Congress, the Reagan Administration announced in 1985 its
intention to establish a $300 million Tied Aid Credit Fund, also
known as the "War Chest," within Eximbank.5 e The War Chest
was intended to provide leverage for the U.S. delegation to the
OECD negotiations on tied aid credit practices. 7 Eximbank
used the War Chest offensively against countries whose practices
obstructed the negotiations process.5"
"2 Id at 57 (AID would provide the grant element, and Eximbank would
provide the export credit).
"'But see Gentlemen, Please, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1984, at 16 (U.S.
ed. at 16) (describing Eximbank's threat to pull out of the Gentlemen's
Agreement if the guidelines were not followed more closely). See also Aid
and Trade: Mixing It Up, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 1984, at 45 (U.S. ed. at
27) (observing that at the then upcoming OECD negotiations, the United States
would try to raise the grant element for mixed credits from the 20% to 50%
so that"the aid ought to be such a big chunk of a mixed credit that exporting
countries which want a plain commercial deal in disguise ought notto bother
with the device at all").
54 Aid and Trade: Mixing It Up, supra note 53.
"See infra Section 4.
"Beggar Thy Creditor,THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1985, at 18 (U.S. ed.
at 16). See generally Eugene L. Stewart, Existing Remedies and the Trade
Deficit: The Promise of Reform Through JudicialReview, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1165, 1168 n.9 (1986) (discussing the origins of the U.S. trade deficit,
the Reagan Administration's failure to aid American business, and the Court
of International Trade's impact on U.S. trade policy).
67 INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 57. See S. REP. No. 320, supra note
13, at 4 ("In the words of the statute, the War Chest was established 'For the
purpose of facilitating the negotiation of a comprehensive international
agreement restricting the use of tied aid and partially untied aid credits for
commercial purposes ....

.' ").

Moravcsik, supra note 5, at 187 (citation omitted); see INT'L FINANCING,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/5
58
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In 1987, the Participants modified the Arrangement by raising
the minimum grant component of mixed credits from 25% to 35%.
The minimum concessionality level for the least developed
countries was raised to 50%." After the conclusion of this new
agreement, the Administration restricted the use of the War
Chest to the policing of the Arrangement, instead of using it
as a negotiating lever.6 0
Contrary to U.S. expectations, the 1987 Arrangement did
not deter mixed credit practices. Consequently, in 1989, Congress
directed Eximbank to use the War Chest aggressively both to
police the agreement and to facilitate negotiations to restrict
tied aid practices further. 1 The reauthorization of the War
Chest in 1989, combined with congressional pressure, helped
prompt the Administration to begin a new round of OECD
negotiations.
In September 1989, the Bush Administration announced a
policy change: it would vigorously pursue negotiations aimed
at reducing tied aid credit practices.6 2 The 'Administration
shifted the use of the War Chest from policing activities back
to leveraging support for new negotiations.6 " To this end, it

supra note 1, at 57 ("Eximbank also began to initiate its own concessional
financing offers, as distinct from the earlier purely defensive posture ofmatching
offers initiated by others.").
" For an overview ofthe effects of the 1987 Arrangement, see Export Credits:
Mixed Bag, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1987, at 75 (U.S. ed. at 75).
"S. REP. No. 320, supra note 13, at 4. Consequently, Eximbank used
$78 million of its $100 million War Chest appropriation in fiscal year 1987
("FY87"), and only $7.6 million of its $110 million FY88 appropriation. In
FY89, Eximbank did not use the War Chest. Id. at 4-5.
' Id. at 5. The Administration did not, however, seek to establish a separate
tied aid credit program. INTVL FINANCING, supra note 1, at 57.
62 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT To THE U.S. CONGRESS ON
TIED AID CREDIT PRACTICES: ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A U.S.
RESPONSE 1 (1989), reprintedin PREEG CSIS STUDY, supranote 6, at Appendix
B [hereinafter TREASURY]. The September 1989 announcement came in response
to Congressional criticism that the mandated 1989 Eximbank report on tied
aid credits lacked policy recommendations.
63 S. REP. No. 320, supra note 13, at 5.
As a result of the shift in
Administration policy, use of the War Chest rose from zero in FY89 to $53.3
million in FY90 to $145 million in FY91. IcL FY91 appropriations were $150
million. 1991 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT, supranote 19, at 7.Thus, almost
all of the FY91 War Chest funds were expended. Id.
U.S. negotiators at the OECD focused their efforts on eliminating "the
most important tied aid trade distortions, which center on telecommunications,
transportation, and communications equipment, and eliminat[ing] tied aid
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targeted War Chest funds primarily at spoiled sectors and
markets." In May 1990, AID and Eximbank created a joint
$500 million pool of funds for capital goods financing to target
the spoiled markets of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Pakistan. Also in 1990, the Administration proposed to OECD
members to keep Central and Eastern Europe "tied aid free." 5
3.2. The New OECD Arrangement: The Helsinki Package
The pressure for negotiations finally culminated in an
agreement that entered into force on February 15, 1992.68 The
latest Arrangement is commonly known as the Helsinki Package.
3.2.1. General Terms Of The New Agreement
Effective February 15, 1992:
1. Tied aid credits to higher income countries (countries
whose 1990 per capita income exceeded $2,465) are barred.
2. Tied aid credits to lower income countries ("LLDC's")
extended for both public and private projects must have
a minimum concessionality level of 50%.
3. Tied aid credits to middle income countries are

in countries that can clearly afford not to be subsidized." Eximbank Holds
Meetings with Kuwaitis on U.S. Support for Post-War Project, 8 Intl Trade
Rep. (BNA) 299 (Feb. 27, 1991).
'TREASURY,supra note 62, at 4.
Senate BankingHearing,supranote 1, at 58. At the Houston Summit
in July 1990, leaders of the major industrialized nations reaffirmed their
commitment to try to keep Central and Eastern Europe free of tied aid.
Secretary of State James Baker noted the importance of keeping the region
free of tied aid creditsin remarks before a session of the Council of Ministers'
meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on June
19, 1991. Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 1991 U.S.
Dep't of State Dispatch (July 1, 1991). The OECD Ministers agreed to "try
to avoid Tied Aid credits other than outright grants, food aid and humanitarian
aid into Central and Eastern Europe." Senate Banking Hearing,supranote
1, at 58 (statement of William E. Barreda).
" The United States initiated parallel efforts within the Export Credit
Arrangement forum (sometimes referred to as the Export Credit Group, or
"ECG") and the Development Assistance Committee ("DAC"), both of which
are formal organs of the OECD. Senate Banking Hearing,supra note 1, at
55 (statement of William E. Barreda). The Participants are an informal group
whose members sometimes meet formally as the ECG to discuss tied aid credits.
Telephone interview with Robert Y. Lee, supra note 10. See also supra note
46.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/5
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prohibited unless the project (a) is not financially viable
or (b) would be financially viable but cannot be financed
on Arrangement or on market terms. Such tied aid credits
must have a minimum concessionality level of 35%.'
Instead of raising the concessionality level of tied aid
credits," the Helsinki Package focuses on the concept of financial
viability. A project is financially viable if "with appropriate
pricing determined on market principles... [the project can]
generate cash flow sufficient to cover the project's operating costs
and to service the capital employed."' By concentrating official
development assistance on projects that are not financially viable,
the total flow of resources to developing countries-including
commercial credits, officially supported export credits, and official
development aid-will increase.70
The Arrangement also institutes a comprehensive reporting
and consultations process in order to enforce the rules and to
increase the transparency of tied aid credit offers. Upon the
requisite notification of an intended tied aid credit offer, any

'7 Aid credits refer to tied or partially untied aid credits over SDR 2 million
with concessionality of less than 80%, but do not refer to untied aid credits.
OECD, ARRANGEMENTS ON GUIDELINES FOR OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT
CREDITS 8, OCDE/GD(92)95, Paris, 1992 [hereinafter ARRANGEMENT]. The
SDRis "the IMF Special Drawing Right weighted average of the interest rates
...[based on] the U.S. dollar, Deutsche mark, Japanese yen, French franc
and pound Sterling." Id. at 25. The new Arrangement makes tied aid credits
for commercially viable projects extremely costly by requiring an 80% grant
element.
"Another suggestion considered by the Participants was limiting the use
of tied aid credits in spoiled markets and sectors. Ray, supra note 2, at 8.
" ARRANGEMENT, supra note 67, at 9. Government aid funds are truly

"additional,"see supranote 4, if they are designed for worthwhile aid projects

that nonetheless lack the ability to "generate sufficient financial returns to
make them attractive enough to call forth commercial financing and do not
attract officially supported export credits." Ray, supra note 2, at 9. This "is
an attempt to replicate the efficient financing patterns ofmarket economies."
Senate Banking Hearing,supra note 1, at 55 (statement of William E. Barreda).
In May 1991, the chairmen of both the Participants and the OECD's
Development Assistance Committee expressed the following view: "OECD
Members' export credit [and] tied aid policies should be complementary: those
for export credits should be based on open competition and the free play of
market forces; those for tied aid credits should provide needed external resources
to countries, sectors, or projects with little or no access to market financing;
ensure best value for money; minimize trade distortion; and contribute to
developmentally effective use of these resources." Ray, supra note 2, at 1.
7* Ray, supra note 2, at 9.
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Participant may challenge the project and request face-to-face
consultations on possible trade motivations for the tied or partially
untied aid credits."1 If there is not "substantial support" among
the Participants for the use of tied aid credit in the project, the
country offering the credit will be asked not to proceed. Over
time, the consultations process will develop a body of "case law"
defining financial viability."2
While the current rules do not apply to Central and Eastern
Europe, the Helsinki Package reaffirms the Participants'
agreement, reached in June 1991, "to try to avoid... credits
other than outright
grants, food aid and humanitarian aid" in
3
that region.7
Additionally, several explicit exceptions to the new rules exist.
First, if a country's offer of a tied aid credit does not receive
"substantial support" in face-to-face consultations, the country
may nonetheless proceed with the offer by notifying the Secretary
General of the OECD that overriding non-trade related national
interest has forced the action.7 4
Another major exception to the new guidelines are the
transition rules. These rules "grandfather" aid offers and credit
lines committed prior to the entry into force of the agreement
on February 15, 1992. 5 In general, credit lines committed prior
to February 15, 1992, are grandfathered for two years. s

ARRANGEMENT, supra note 67, at 13.
7' HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Rade of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1991)
[hereinafter House ForeignAffairs Hearing] (statement of W.L. McCamey,
Director, Office of Trade Fin., Dep't of Treasury); see also ARRANGEMENT, supra
note 67, at 9.
The DAC decided on April 23, 1992 to adopt the stricter rules of the new
Arrangement. Exim Approves Mixed Credit for Sale of U.S. Goods, Services
To Tunisia, 9 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 860 (May 13, 1992).
78
ARRANGEMENT, supra note 67, at 26 n.7.
74 Ik at 13. However, "[t]he Participants expect that such an occurrence
will be unusual and infrequent." Id. (emphasis omitted).
7" The February 15, 1992 deadline prompted a surge of tied aid credit
notifications prior to February 15. During the first six weeks of 1992, 286
transactions were notified. 1993 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT, supra note
1, at 6. The Treasury Department explained that the "surge of such notifications
... essentially represents an acceleration of notifications that would have
been notified in any event." Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 1, at 56
(statement of William E. Barreda).
76 Credit lines to Mexico are grandfathered for one year, until December
31, 1992. 1993 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
71
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However, tied aid credit offers for individual projects under these
credit lines operate under the old rules only through August 15,
1992. After the six-month grace period, tied aid credits under
grandfathered credit lines may not be used to finance "commercially viable" individual projects." While the United States would
have preferred less grandfathering, it understood that negotiations
would have been impossible if the Arrangement did not recognize
the "pipeline problem": many aid agencies had already expended
considerable funds on projects that would not conform to the
new rules. 8
3.2.2. PreliminaryResults Of The New Agreement
While there is a sense that the jury is still out on the
effectiveness of the Helsinki Package, Eximbank's April 1993
semi-annual report to Congress for the first time presents data
on the functioning of the new Arrangement.7 9 This data suggests
that a body of case law has been developing on the definition
of commercial viability. Since the Arrangement has come into
effect, there have been 41 formal consultations.8 " Of the 36
that have been completed, 13 tied aid projects were deemed "not
commercially viable" and consequently could continue.8 1 Sixteen

challenged tied aid projects were deemed "commercially viable."
In seven of these, the governments proceeded through the
derogation clause of the Arrangement by notifying the Secretary
General that overriding non-trade related national interests
permitted them to offer the credit.8" Eximbank noted that "[t]he
U.S. expected derogations to be concentrated in the early stages
of the implementation of the new rules... because the new tied

" Through December 31,1992, tied aid credits offered to Mexico are governed

by the old rules. Id.
73 Id

79 1993 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT, supra note 1. This data is based
on OECD figures which "are not precise." Id. at 5 n.2. In 1992, Congressmen
Douglas Bereuter and Sam Gejdenson directed the General Accounting Office
to report on what they expect to be the unreliability of the OECD data. The
Report should be available by the end of 1993.

Id- at 6.

SlId. at 7.
8

Id- Only one of these derogations involved a project in which a U.S.
exporter wanted to compete. Eximbank offered to match the foreign tied aid
offer, which involved a high-technology telecommunications project in Indonesia.
Id. at 8.
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aid credit rules represent a sharp break from the past.""
However, "the U.S. is signalling its intention that the current
pace of derogations should not continue beyond the early
implementation phase of the agreement."8 With regard to the
tied aid free zone proposed for Central and Eastern Europe,85
the report states that in 1992, there were no notifications of tied
aid for those countries. 86
The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union
were initially classified as higher income countries under the
Arrangement and were thus ineligible for tied aid. World Bank
data for 1991, however, suggests that all but the five richest
former Soviet republics would be eligible for tied aid. Nonetheless,
the Participants agreed in March 1993 to wait another year before
reclassifying these states.
3.2.3. Bush AdministrationReaction To The New Arrangement
The Bush Administration welcomed the long-awaited Helsinki
Package. Eximbank announced that "[the OECD] agreement
is a major step forward in the long battle against trade-distorting
use of aid. However, the jury is still out, and we will need to
very closely monitor it."8 The President of Eximbank pointed
out that U.S. companies would no longer have to bear an
estimated annual loss of $4 to $6 billion as a result of subsidized
financing by other industrialized countries." ' A senior Treasury
Department official has stated:
[The administration] believes this agreement will
significantly reduce the disadvantages faced by U.S.
exporters who have had to compete against foreign firms
with access to concessional financing. It will not eliminate
trade-distorting aid practices, but it is our hope that it
will permit U.S. business to compete more effectively by
returning the emphasis of competition to price, quality
88 1993 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
84

d

ar See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

86 1993 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REPORT, supra note 1, at 9, 17.
87 U.S. to Use "WarChest' to PoliceCompliance with OECD 7yed Aid Pact,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 880 (Jan. 1, 1992).
88 Stuart Auerbach, 24 Nations Agree To Curb Use of Export Subsidies,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 1991, at C2.
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and service rather than financing subsidies." '
In response to the agreement, the Bush Administration shifted
its War Chest policy from one of encouraging negotiations to
monitoring compliance with the agreement.9 0
The Administration also announced its intention to work closely with
Eximbank, AID, other interested agencies, and the U.S. business
community to insure the aggressive implementation of the
agreement. 9 ' However, both the business community and
Congress expressed skepticism over the Helsinki Package.
3.2.4. Initial Clinton Administration Tied Aid Policy
The Clinton Administration has made no significant
operational changes in the U.S. tied aid credit policy developed
by the Bush Administration.92 The tied aid issue is currently
under review in three discussion arenas: the Trade Promotion
Coordination Committee, the National Security Council-National
Economic Council-Presidential Review Directive 20 group, and

S House ForeignAffairs Hearing,supra note 72, at 14 (statement of W.L.

McCamey).
" "We expect to use the War Chest primarily to selectively match other
countries' offers in cases where tied aid should not be used-particularly where
face-to-face consultations have not resulted in the withdrawal of a tied aid
offer considered inappropriate." Id. at 23 (statement of James R. Sharpe,
Executive Vice President, Eximbank).
The United States had responded to the 1987 Arrangement with a similar
policy shift. See supra Section 3.1.
" House ForeignAffairs Hearing,supranote 72, at 14 (statement of W.L.
McCamey).
" Telephone conversations with Robert Y. Lee, supra note 10; Clement
K. Miller, Special Assistant to the Senior Vice President for International
Lending, Export-Import Bank (July 22,1993); Donna La Torre, Subcommittee
Staff Consultant, Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 22, 1993); Peggy Houlihan,
Executive Director, Coalition for Employment through Exports ("CEE") (July
22,1993); Ernest H. Preeg, William M. Scholl Chair in International Business,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 21, 1993). The Clinton
Administration appears to be focusing most of its attention on domestic affairs,
rather than on the foreign assistance program. Nonetheless, the Administration
has made a series of statements suggesting that tied aid policy would change.
See Brody Urges Reconsiderationof U.S. Policy on Tied Aid, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) (June 9, 1993) ("Eximbank is doing all it can to have the U.S. government
change its position.... Given that other countries are using tied aid, perhaps
the United States should rethink its policy."). However, the Administration
has
done
to indicate
that change
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a State Department study group.9" The business community
and Congress continue to criticize current U.S. government policy
and to suggest that participation in the OECD Arrangement
is not enough to combat the problem. 9 '
4. CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES REGARDING
THE TIED AID CREDIT PROBLEM
During the 1980's, Congress was the main impetus behind
the Bush Administration's decision to confront the tied aid credit
issue. The Administration reacted by vigorously pursuing
negotiations within the OECD, but many in Congress preferred
a legislative solution. A number of initiatives attempted to shift
U.S. foreign aid philosophy away from humanitarian concerns
and towards funding for capital infrastructure projects.9 5 One
solution was to grant government agencies greater authority
to participate in mixed credit activities, for tied aid credits are
most commonly offered for capital infrastructure projects and
thus represent an important tool for gaining entry to the market
for capital projects. The majority of initiatives emphasized the
funding of capital projects, either through tied or untied aid
activity. Senator David Boren expressed one of Congress'
fundamental concerns: in the post-Cold War era, "[m]ore and
more leadership in the world is going to be determined as much
by economic strength, if not more, than by military strength alone.
We must adjust to the change in conditions in the world." 6
Furthermore, many on Capitol Hill felt that the Bush Administrations strategy of 'leading by example" was ideologically

Telephone interview with Clement K. Miller, Eximbank, and Peggy

Houlihan, CEE (July 22, 1993).

4
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE RoLE OF THE U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK, GAO/GGD-93-3952 (Dec. 23, 1992).
,' But see the Tied Aid Credit Reduction Act of 1991, a proposal by Senator
Jake Garn that focuses specifically on combatting tied aid practices rather
than shifting U.S. foreign aid policy towards capital projects funding. S. 1161,
102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991), reprintedin 137 CONG. REC. S6691 (daily ed.
May 24, 1991). No action was taken on this bill.
2B 137 CONG. REC. S10,859 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Senator
David L. Boren); see also ODC PAPER, supra note 41, at 2 ("As the political
and strategic imperatives [of the Cold War] that drove foreign policy and the
foreign aid program evaporate, many assert that a nation's economic strength
determines its status in the world hierarchy.").
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appealing, but unrealistic.""
4.1. Legislative InitiativesDuring The 102d Congress
4.1.1. The Aid For Trade Act Of 1991
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, Senators David L. Boren,
Lloyd Bentsen, Robert C. Byrd, and Max Baucus were among

the most ardent Capitol Hill proponents of modifying the U.S.
foreign aid philosophy to yield more domestic economic benefit.9"
Their 1991 "Aid For Trade Act," S. 571, would have required
Eximbank and AID to utilize more resources to help U.S. exporters
gain market access to capital infrastructure projects. 9 Senator
Boren introduced the Aid For Trade Act, explaining that "[w]e
must leverage our foreign policy assets in order to enhance our
economic p6wer."'0 Recognizing that other major industrialized
nations openly use their foreign aid for domestic economic
benefit, 01 the bill would have allocated more foreign assistance

Frank, supra note 42, at S10,862 ("[T]he administration['s] strategy of
leading by example and hoping against hope for the best from OECD
negotiations may be ideologically satisfying to free traders but it will never
get results.").
" The four Senators sent a letter to President Bush in 1991 to express
their concern about the failure of the OECD to reach a new agreement on
the issue of tied aid credits. The letter points out that tied aid credits unfairly
shut U.S. exporters out of foreign markets and deny the neediest countries
access to limited funding resources. Letter from Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Senator
David L. Boren, Senator Robert C. Byrd, and Senator Max Baucus to President
George Bush (June 27, 1991), reprintedin 137 CONG. REC. S10,859-60 (daily
ed. July 25, 1991). For a thorough discussion of the Senators' views, see 137
CONG. REC. S10,858-69.
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman subsequently joined the efforts of these
Senators, who were often referred to as the "Four B's."
*"The President of Eximbank remarked that the proposal played a role
in the success of the OECD negotiations because it aroused "fear that the
Americans might in frustration adopt a more commercial edge to their aid
programs." John D. Macomber, Aids To Trade, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1992,
at A17.
I" 137 CONG. REC. S2808 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. Boren).
""The Congress finds that.., other governments, which incorporate
national commercial considerations into their export policies, provide their
firms with a wide variety of export financing assistance, including.., mixed
credit financing.... [Moreover,] the United States provides far less in capital
project assistance than do the other major OECD countries." S. 571, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S2808 (daily ed. Mar.
6, 1991).
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funds to capital projects, which reap greater economic return
than AID's traditional humanitarian projects." 2 Ultimately,
the bill died.
4.1.2. Boren Amendment To The Foreign Assistance
Authorization
The Senate overwhelmingly adopted an amendment based
on the Aid For Trade Act in the 1991 foreign assistance
authorization legislation."° While the amendment passed
by a vote of 99-0, the foreign assistance legislation never became
law. However, the debate on the amendment is informative of
Congressional opinion. As in the introductory remarks about
the Aid For Trade Act, the debate reflected Congress' concern
that the United States is failing to adapt to a changing world,
where economic power may mean more than military
strength.' Once again, the initiative echoed the concern that
the United States does not reap nearly enough domestic economic
benefit from its foreign assistance. Senator Boren emphasized
that "[n]inety-plus percent of our aid virtually goes without strings
attached. Only 8% of the foreign aid of the United States...
this past year, went out with strings attached in the form of

The bill mandates that over a period of five years, the minimum level
ofbilateral economic assistance used for capital projects would increase from
10% to 35%. Id. at S2810-11 (summarizing the Boren-Bentsen-Byrd-Baucus
Aid For Trade Act Of 1991).
Unlike AID's traditional projects, capital projects (such as transportation,
power, and telecommunications systems) benefit not only the recipient nation,
but also the donor nation since "the design, construction, and servicing...
are done by national exporting companies." 137 CONG. REC. S2810-11 (daily
ed. Mar. 6, 1991).
The Aid for Trade Act also restricts waivers, which AID had been granting
rather liberally, of the requirement that all products purchased with U.S.
foreign aid must be bought in the United States. Id. at S2811.
Critics of the bill included the State Department, which said that "[i]t
would severely restrict the administration's ability to promote U.S. political
and security interests," and members of Congress who championed either
the national security or the basic human needs rationale for aiding foreign
countries. Aid for Trade Debate, supra note 26, at 12.
"' See Helen Dewar, Senate Approves 'Buy American' Provisionfor Aid
Recipients,WASH. POST, July 26, 1991, at A24; 137 CONG. REC. S10,869 (daily
ed. July 25, 1991) (vote of 99-0); see also "Aid For Trade" Foreign Aid Plan
Passes Senate, PRESS RELEASE (Office of U.S. Sen. David Boren), July 25,
1991.
102

10 See supra Section 4.
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spending on capital projects that would require the purchase
of American goods with the funds."1"' In contrast, Japan spent
61% of its foreign aid on capital projects; Germany, 46%; and
Italy, 62%."~ The Boren amendment would have created an
AID Capital Projects Office with increased funding for capital
projects." ° Directing both tied and untied aid credits to capital
projects would bring greater economic return and would enable
the United States to enter the capital projects market.0"
4.1.3. OPICReauthorization
While the foreign aid legislation ultimately stalled, the Boren
amendment made its way into the reauthorization of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), which was signed into
law. This new legislation, known as the "Jobs Through Exports
Act," formally establishes the Office of Capital Projects within
AID "to promote U.S. capital projects while at the same time
promoting international development."'
It also directs AID
106 137 CONG. REC. S10,859 (daily ed. July 25, 1991). However, Senator

Paul Sarbanes noted that the 8% figure is misleading and argued that 65-70%
of the total foreign assistance budget is spent in the United States. Id at
S10,868. On the other hand, Senator Boren appeared to be more concerned
with the loss of follow-ons, like requests for servicing and spare parts, which
annually bring in 10-15% of the project's original price, NAM REPORT, supra
note 33, and help build a relationship of trust that makes future contracts
more likely. 137 CONG. REC. at S10,866.
1" 137 CONG. REC. S10,860 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Boren); INT'L FINANCING, supra note 1, at 38.
10 Funding for capital projects would increase from $573 millionin FY91
to $750 million in FY92 to $1 billion in FY93. 137 CONG. REC. S10,858 (daily
ed. July 25, 1991). There had been concern that capital projects funding would
drop to $420 million in FY92. Id. at S10,862 (statement of Sen. Boren).
'U Concern was also voiced that other nations are assisting the Eastern
European countries with export credits, which involves sending their own
goods to the recipients, whereas the United States has predominantly offered
cash assistance, with relatively little tied to the purchases of U.S. goods. See
Frank, supra note 42, at S10,861; see generallyHouse ForeignAffairsHearing,
supra note 72, at 57-71 (statement of Randolph C. Lumb, Vice President,
Strategy and Market Development, AT&T).
10, H.R. REP. No. 551, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1992).
However, the Capital Projects Fund received no separate funding by the
Appropriations Committee. The House Committee on Appropriations noted
concern that the Administration had not requested a new Capital Projects
Fund and that such funding would require a reduction of assistance to "critical
development priorities such as health, education and child survival." H.R.
REP. No. 585, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1992). The Committee also prohibited
increasing the operating expenses of the Capital Projects Office. Id at 68.
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to coordinate with the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee
to support capital projects and to use funds available to AID
11
for tied aid purposes.
Furthermore, it urges the President
to use $650 million in FY92 and $700 million in FY93 for
developmentally-sound capital projects.1 '
4.1.4. Export-ImportBank Reauthorization
The Export Enhancement Act of 1992 confronts the issue
of tied aid credits directly by funding the War Chest. In this
recharter of Eximbank, Congress finds that "exports are a crucial
force driving the United States economy. . . [and] exports also
support the global strategic position of the United States.""
The legislation authorizes $500 million annually for the War
Chest for each of fiscal years 1993-95."'
It also enables
Eximbank to use the War Chest offensively, in contrast to the
Bush Administration's decision to use it only to police the new
Arrangement."" The bill makes clear that Eximbank has the
authority to use the War Chest not only to match tied aid credits
offered by foreign governments in violation of the OECD
Arrangement, but also: (1) when it is in the economic interests
to match a tied aid offer, particularly when that offer is part
of a grandfathered credit; and (2) when a foreign government
is engaged in "predatory financing practices" that circumvent
the Arrangement without formally violating it." 5
The
legislation also establishes a Trade Promotion Coordinating
1, Jobs Through Exports Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-549, § 302, 106 Stat.
3651 (1992). The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee was established
by the Export Enhancement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-429, § 201, 106 Stat.
2186, 2199 (1992).
. The bill explicitly states that these funds may not be drawn from
development assistance accounts, which are AID's main source of humanitarian
funding. Jobs Through Exports Act § 306.
1 Export Enhancement Act of 1992 § 101.
113
Id. § 103. This three-year authorization was intentionally shorterthan
the five year authorization provided for the Eximbank charter itself. S. REP.
No. 320, supra note 13, at 6.
The foreign assistance appropriations made up to $200 million available
for FY93 for tied aid credits. Foreign Operations, Export Financing
Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-391, Title IV, 106 Stat. 1633 (1992).
114 See supra Section 3.2.3.
11r S. REP. No. 320, supra note 13, at 6-8. For example, the Japanese
government has been roundly criticized for its technically "untied" aid practices
which effectively tie its aid. See supra note 28.
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Committee to coordinate export promotion and financing activities
of the United States.1n
4.1.5. Freedom SupportAct
On the level of general U.S. export promotion, the Freedom
Support Act of 1992, a legislative assistance package for the
former Soviet Union, helps U.S. businesses enter the individual
markets in the Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS").
Senator Lieberman offered an amendment to the legislation
establishing a presidential Business Advisory Council to
coordinate activities of government agencies with American
business expertise. The Lieberman proposal, which was enacted
into law as part of the legislation, encourages the President to
fund capital projects in these states."" The legislation also
directs the President's attention to any country that violates
the OECD agreement with respect to any of the independent
states of the former Soviet Union." 8
4.2. Legislative InitiativesIn The 103d Congress
During the 103d Congress, legislative initiatives focused on
capital projects funding, not on the use of tied aid credits."'

§ 201.
138 CONG. REC. S9591 (daily ed. July 2, 1992); Freedom Support Act,

116 Export Enhancement Act of 1992
117

Pub. L. No. 102-511, §§ 302-03, 106 Stat. 3320, 3333 (1992). Letters from
the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the National Association of Manufacturers, and Business for U.S. Trade with
CIS Republics supporting the Lieberman amendment appear in 138 CONG.
REC. S9593-97 (daily ed. July 2, 1992).
118 Freedom Support Act § 306 ("Should the Secretary of the Treasury
determine that foreign countries are engaged in tied aid practices with respect
to any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union that violate the
1991 Helsinki agreement of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the President should give priority attention to combatting such
practices.").
Under the Helsinki Package, independent states of the former Soviet Union
are currently classified as higher income countries and are thus ineligible
for tied aid credits.
...The Administration's requests for tied aid dropped from $115 million
for FY92 to $100 million for FY93 to $50 million for FY94. Eximbank to Request
$757 Million in FY 1994 for $16.5 Billion in Support, Intl Trade Reporter
(BNA) (Apr. 7, 1993). The Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs Act of 1994, H.R. 2295, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Title IV, as passed
by the House, appropriates $50 million for tied aid credits.
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4.2.1. The Aid For Trade Act Of 1993
Senator David Boren reintroduced the Aid For Trade Act,
S. 722, in April 1993, along with Senators Baucus, Byrd,
Lieberman, and Roth as original co-sponsors. This bill takes
a different approach than the previous Aid For Trade legislation.
Bypassing AID, the proposed bill would authorize $435 million
for the Trade and Development Agency ("TDA") to finance capital
The findings section echoes the sentiments
projects.120
expressed during the previous Congress that the "United States
must leverage its foreign assistance program, in a humane and
balanced , way, to enhance American economic competitiveness."' The findings also note that "notwithstanding
...[the

recent OECD agreement] to restrict the practice of tied

aid, America's economic competitors are skillfully using their
foreign assistance programs to expand markets for their
goods."'22 To date, there has been no action on the bill.
4.2.2. ForeignAssistance Authorization Act Of 1993
The House of Representatives version of the foreign aid bill,
which passed in June 1993, would establish a capital projects
pilot program within the TDA. 2 3 The legislation authorizes
$300 million for developmentally sound capital projects in
developing countries and in countries making the transition from
a nonmarket to a market economy. The House Committee on
Foreign Affairs noted that it "is establishing this program because
it is dissatisfied with the way AID has managed capital
projects."'"
The foreign assistance bill would require the President to
InS. 722, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993). The bill, if enacted, would also
progressively cut cash transfers from the Economic Support Fund. Such a
provision would decrease AID's funding for humanitarian projects, a step that
many within the Administration and executive agencies are unwilling to take.
1 Id. § 2(2).
1 d. § 2(3).
In H.R.2404,103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1505 (1993). During the 102d Congress,
the OPIC Reauthorization established an Office of Capital Projects at AID,
but the office never received funding by the Appropriations Committee. See
supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
24
1

HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 2333,

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ACT OF 1993, H. REP. No. 126, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 126 (1993).
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transfer, with certain qualifications, the $300 million from
economic support funds, funds relating to assistance for the
independent states of the former Soviet Union, and funds available
under the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989
to the capital projects pilot program.'2 However, the Senate
has not moved forward with its foreign assistance authorization.
More importantly, the foreign assistance appropriation for FY94
passed by the House does not mention the $300 million fund.1"'
Even if the program remains unfunded in FY94, at the very least,
the initiative suggests that many in Congress support funding
capital projects as an integral part of the foreign assistance
program.
5. RESPONSE OF THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY
In general, U.S. businesses have favored more aggressive
solutions to the tied aid credit problem than the Bush and Clinton
Administrations. Two groups have frequently testified before
Congress to represent the interests of the American business
community: the Coalition for Employment through Exports
("CEE")127128and the National Association of Manufacturers

("NAM").

Both CEE and NAM criticized the Bush Administration's
sector-by-sector approach to OECD negotiations, claiming that
it would lead to a piecemeal solution to the tied aid credit
problem. 1 29 During the 102d Congress, the business community

H.R. 2404, § 1505.
, H.R. 2295, supra note 119.
"7 CEE is a broad-based non-profit organization representing U.S. exporters,
organizedlabor, state governors, and local officials. Organizedin 1981, CEE
serves as an advocate of the U.S. exporting community for the promotion of
exports abroad, which increases employment in the United States. House
125

Banking Hearing,supra note 35, at 29 (testimony of Thomas J. Mullany).
'" NAM is a trade association representing the interests of more than
12,000 member companies and subsidiaries. Much larger and more broadly-

focused than CEE, NAM often works with CEE on the issue of export financing,
which is CEE's primary focus.
1" See Eximbank Reports Progress

in OECD Talks, But Industry Groups
Fault Tied Aid Strategy, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 566, 567 (Apr. 17, 1991).

The sector-by-sector approach was endorsed by the Bush Administration in
its September 1989 policy recommendations. TREASURY, supra note 62, at
45. The approach involves targeting tied aid credit offers in sectors and markets
where U.S. exporters have specific commercial interests, especially in areas

nations
use tied
aid credits
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supported the following: giving Eximbank the authority to use
tied aid credits to match offers grandfathered under the Helsinki
Package, the statutory establishment of AID's Office of Capital
Projects, and the Freedom Support Act. 3 0 In general, Congress'
aggressive posture has reflected the attitudes of U.S. exporters
as expressed by CEE and NAM.
Expressing frustration over the damage tied aid credits have
wreaked on U.S. exporters, CEE has advocated increasing War
Chest funding for offensive use, rather than relying solely on
negotiations within the OECD to solve the problem. In 1991,
CEE also supported the establishment of a $1 billion capital
projects fund at AID.'
More recently, CEE has advocated
establishing a capital projects program at TDA as authorized
in the House foreign assistance bill. CEE chose this approach
because TDA "already has a dual mandate of supporting
development and promoting American exports," whereas AID
has always been focused on development assistance programs
that provide for basic human needs. 3 2
5.2. Business Community Criticism Of The Helsinki Package
While U.S. exporters are giving the Clinton Administration
a grace period for the Helsinki Package to take effect, they
nonetheless remain skeptical of the agreement's ability to solve
the tied aid credit problem and to improve the relative
international position of U.S. exports.
At a House hearing shortly after the Helsinki Package entered
into force, CEE expressed several concerns:' 3 3 (1) the agreement

z See supra Section 4.
's The Export-ImportBank: Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Int'lFinance
and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,Housing,and Urban
Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1991) (statement of James C. Cox, Treasurer,
Int'l Westinghouse Electric Corp., on behalf of the CEE).
" Hearing before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade & the
Environment of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,
14-15 (1993) (statement of John Hardy, Jr., Director, Corporate Development
and Finance, Brown & Root, Inc., on behalf of CEE) (May 4, 1993). See also
Letter from the Trade and Development Coalition to Congressman Lee H.
Hamilton (June 14, 1993) (expressing CEE and other trade organization's
support for the provision in the House foreign aid bill establishing a capital
projects pilot program administered by TDA).
"aSeeHouse BankingHearing,supranote 35, at 156-58; see also Bankers
FavorEximbank Renewal; Worry About War Chest, CreditReform, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. 874 (BNA) (May 20, 1992).
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is non-binding and, therefore, unenforceable;'" (2) a loophole
overlooks many foreign aid offers, particularly Japanese offers,
that have the effect of tied aid credits but are not technically
"tied" as defined by the agreement; (3) using the War Chest to
police the agreement will not be enough-it should be used
selectively to meet foreign financing offers that are exempt under
the Arrangement; and (4) AID should have more resources for
capital projects that are allowed under the agreement. As
mentioned above, CEE has recently supported a capital projects
fund at TDA instead of AID.
NAM has expressed serious concern over the Arrangement's
grandfathering clause-noting that it exempts about $10 billion
in tied aid'S--and suggested better coordination of the tied
3
aid credit programs by Eximbank."'
NAM also recommended
increased funding for the War Chest and for feasibility studies
through the Trade and Development Program.'
Westinghouse Electric Corporation and AT&T share NAM
and CEE's concerns regarding the Helsinki Package. Westinghouse expressed concern that enforcement of the agreement would
depend "on the good faith and cooperation of the participant
governments"' and that the "national interest" exception in
the Arrangement could be abused.' Recommendations include:
(1) maintaining an active War Chest, instead of shifting back
to a defensive policy of policing; 40 (2) maintaining an active
dialogue with the U.S. exporting community so that as "financial

13 The U.S. business community is particularly concerned that the
government will fail to police the agreement aggressively. See generallyHouse
ForeignAffairs Hearing, supra note 72.
13 See NAM Promotes Eximbank Charter Renewal, Increased Funding
for Overall Program, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 436, 437 (Mar. 11, 1992).
1' See NAM REPORT, supra note 33, at Policy Recommendation.
'" These studies are one of the most effective ways for U.S. businesses
to gain an advantage in bidding for projects in developing countries. See NAM
Promotes Eximbank CharterRenewal, supra note 135, at 437. Feasibility
studies are thought to be one reason for Japan's success in the capital projects
market. See supra note 28.
'" House ForeignAffairs Hearing,supranote 72, at 50 (prepared statement
ofJames C. Cox). "The burden of success [depends] on a level of peer pressure."
Id. at 82 (statement of Bruce B. Talley, Director, Gov't Affairs, Asea Brown
Boveri, Inc.).
13 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
House ForeignAffairsHearing,supranote 72, at 52 (prepared statement
of
James
C. Cox);
id at 68Repository,
(statement
Published by Penn Law:
Legal Scholarship
2014of Randolph C. Lumb).

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 14:3

viability" is defined, the United States does not compromise too
much in response to pressure from other governments; (3)
increasing coordination of Eximbank, AID, and TDA to help meet
the problem of untied aid that damages U.S. exports; and (4)
continuing congressional oversight of the problem, including close
communication with the Administration and the business
community. 41
AT&T criticized the agreement for not covering a number
of tied aid practices. The company specifically noted that the
agreement "doesn't control OECD practices, [and] isn't clear about
whether it captures all bilateral funding stakes in restricted
countries.""4 AT&T recommended expanding the use of the
War Chest to combat these tied aid practices. 43
In short, U.S. companies recognize that the Helsinki Package
has major loopholes. Moreover, whether the Clinton Administration will enforce it rigorously is uncertain. Strict
enforcement of the Helsinki Package alone, however, will not
suffice. The government must look beyond the OECD Arrangement. In order to respond to the needs of the business community,
and ultimately the domestic economy,' the foreign aid program
must encompass not only AID's humanitarian mandate, but also
capital projects support, similar to the U.S.'s major competitors.'45
6. CONCLUSION
This Comment has described the implications of tied aid credit
practices for U.S export policy. When such practices are utilized
by foreign governments, they reduce the flow of aid resources
141
141

Id. at 52-54 (prepared statement of James C. Cox).
Id. at 65 (statement of Randolph C. Lumb).

See id. at 68.
The NAM report discusses the widespread domestic impact of major
export transactions. The report includes data from AT&T, Boeing, Fluor Daniel,
and Arkel International on the significantripple effect of export transactions
on suppliers all over the United States. NAM REPORT, supra note 33.
. 1During
the 102d Congress, one popular proposal was to create a"Third
Window" within AID to support capital projects. The Third Window would
support U.S. exports for capital projects in developing countries, andits grants
would not be subject to AIDs basic human needs mandate. See INTL FINANCING,
supranote 1, at 65. However, general dissatisfaction with AID combined with
acknowledgement of AID's humanitarian mandate has led to initiatives that
would locate a capital projects fund at TDA. See supra Section 4.2.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss3/5
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and shut U.S. exporters out of foreign markets. In turn, U.S.
industries and employment suffer. The Helsinki Package should
help alleviate the problem. However, the new agreement's nonbinding nature, grandfathering provisions, and loopholes which
allow for de facto tied aid reflect the need for more extensive
international limitations on these practices.
The government must update the 1973 humanitarian mandate
for foreign assistance to include capital projects support. Like
the other major industrialized countries, the United States should
consider a foreign aid program that helps developing nations
while also benefitting the U.S. domestic economy. More aggressive
use of tied aid credits is one solution; such credits are an
important tool for entry into the capital projects market.
However, the Clinton Administration may prefer a solution which
does not tend to distort market function and which is less costly
for the U.S. taxpayer. Opponents of tied aid credits also stress
that the credits draw needed funds from development assistance
activities. A compromise might include softening the sharp
distinction between foreign assistance and export promotion policy.
Congress and the business community have suggested that better
coordination among Eximbank, AID, and TDA will help U.S.
exporters capture projects in developing countries and regain
lost market share.
The Clinton Administration has not formally adopted a new
policy regarding tied aid credits, although studies are underway.
At the very least, the current Administration must look ahead
to the economic changes that are sweeping through Central
Europe, Eastern Europe, and the independent states of the former
Soviet Union. These areas are major potential markets for U.S.
exporters. Clinton entered the presidency promising change.
Although the Helsinki Package represents a fine beginning, U.S.
foreign assistance policy requires attention by the new
Administration in order to assure that U.S. aid and trade policy
is both helpful to recipient nations and carefully formulated to
assure U.S. businesses broad access to foreign markets in the
increasingly global economy.
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